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Guarding a Subspace in High-Dimensional Space
with Two Defenders and One Attacker
Rui Yan, Student Member, IEEE, Zongying Shi, Member, IEEE, and Yisheng Zhong
Abstract—This paper considers a subspace guarding game in
high-dimensional space which consists of a play subspace and
a target subspace. Two faster defenders cooperate to protect
the target subspace by capturing an attacker which strives
to enter the target subspace from the play subspace without
being captured. A closed-form solution is provided from the
perspectives of kind and degree. Contributions of the work
include the use of the attack subspace (AS) method to construct
the barrier, by which the game winner can be perfectly predicted
before the game starts. In addition to this inclusion, with the priori
information about the game result, a critical payoff function is
designed when the defenders can win the game. Then, the optimal
strategy for each player is explicitly reformulated as a saddle-
point equilibrium. Finally, we apply these theoretical results to
a half-space guarding game in three-dimensional space. Since
the whole achieved developments are analytical, they require a
little memory without computational burden and allow for real-
time updates, beyond the capacity of traditional Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs method. It is worth noting that this is the first time in the
current work to consider the target guarding games for arbitrary
high-dimensional space, and in a fully analytical form.
Index Terms—Subspace guarding games, reach-avoid games,
barrier, winning subspaces, and differential games.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLAYER differential games have been studiedextensively, and present important and interesting, but
also challenging, problems in robotics, aircraft control, secu-
rity, and other domains [1]–[6]. In these types of problems
multiplayer reach-avoid differential games attract numerous
attention recently [7]–[10], as they can provide guarantees of
safety and meantime goal satisfactions from the perspective
of game theory. Reach-avoid differential games consider the
scenario of one or more defenders trying to maneuver and
protect a predefined target by reaching a relatively small
distance to one or more attackers, which strive to hit the target
and meanwhile keep a safe distance from the defenders before
the arrival. Differential games of this setup are also called
target guarding games [11].
Such differential games encompass a large number of re-
alistic adversarial situations. For instance, in [12] multiple
defenders in a planar domain are used to prevent multiple
attackers from reaching a static target set. The work by
Garcia et al. [13] studied the dynamic game of an attacker
pursuing a target aircraft protected by a defender, and the
associated state space dimension is six. A multi-agent collision
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China under Grants 61374034 and 1210012.
R. Yan, Z. Shi, and Y. Zhong are with the Department of Automation, Ts-
inghua University, Beijing 100084, China email: yr15@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
and {szy, zys-dau}@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
avoidance problem was considered in [14], in which each
agent is steered from its initial position to a desired goal while
avoiding collisions with obstacles and other agents. In [11], the
target guarding problem [15] was revisited to investigate the
real-time implementation for the optimal solution. The linear
quadratic game theory was employed to solve the problem
of defending an asset in [16]. Motivated by football game,
the authors [17] proposed a three-player differential game
in a square region where two defenders attempt to capture
an attacker before it reaches a specified edge of the game
boundary, which involves six states.
As reach-avoid games, or called target guarding games, are
prevalent in many engineering applications, many methods
have been proposed to deal with them, and have enjoyed great
success in certain conditions. In general, the Hamilton-Jacobi
(HJ) reachability is a powerful tool, as it can compute the
backward reachable set, defined as the set of states from which
a system is guaranteed to have a control strategy to reach a
target set of states, regardless of disturbances and antagonistic
controls. However, the computation of this method relies on
gridding, and hence suffers from the well-known curse of
dimensionality. Actually, the standard HJ method can only
efficiently handle with the systems of up to five states [18].
Attempts to circumvent this problem, via symmetry of the
considered systems [19], linear programming [20], system
decomposition [21], and boundary analysis [22], have been
applied to systems with special structures, but not scalable to
larger problems and still subjected to the inherent inaccuracy.
For special problem setups and system dynamics, geometric
control reveals a huge capacity of providing strategies for the
players. For example, Voronoi diagrams are employed to deal
with group pursuit of one or more evaders, such as minimizing
the area of generalized Voronoi partition of the evader [23],
[24], or pursuing the evader in a relay way [25]. Specifically,
Apollonius circle is introduced to analyze the capture of high-
speed evaders [26], with a better performance than Voronoi-
based approaches. For more complex game domains, such as in
the presence of obstacles, Euclidean shortest path is employed
to construct the dominance region for each player [27]. More
recently, paths of defense have been designed to approximate
the reach-avoid set in [12].
With advances in computation speed, model-predictive con-
trol and reinforcement learning methods have also been used.
As discussed in [28], a supervisory controller based on model-
predictive control was designed and tested in the switched and
symmetric pursuit evasion games. In [29], a feedback, receding
horizon control law was proposed for the defenders to guard
a harbor. Raslan et al. [30] combined a fuzzy logic controller
2with reinforcement learning to train an invader for the guarding
a territory game.
The subspace guarding game addressed in this paper in-
volves two defenders and one attacker moving in the game
space Rn(n ≥ 2), with each player having n states. The game
space Rn is divided into two subspaces by a hyperplane. The
attacker initially lying in one of two subspaces, attempts to en-
ter the other subspace by penetrating the splitting hyperplane,
while two faster defenders aim at protecting the latter subspace
and strive to prevent the attacker by capturing it. From another
side, this game can also be viewed as an evader (the attacker)
tries to escape from a subspace through its boundary which is
a hyperplane, while avoiding adversaries and moving obstacles
formulated as a defense team, especially, two opponents are
considered. To the authors’ knowledge, this is a first attempt
to address target guarding games in high-dimensional space.
The current works involving differential games focus on no
more than three dimensional game space [31]–[34].
Traditionally, the core for reach-avoid games is to compute
the boundary of the reach-avoid set, also called barrier [15],
by which the whole state space is split into two disjoint
subspaces: defender winning subspace (DWS) and attacker
winning subspace (AWS). The DWS is the set of initial states,
from which the defenders are capable of guaranteeing the
attacker’s capture before it reaches the target subspace. The
set of initial states which lead to the attacker’s successful entry
into the target subspace without being captured, is the AWS.
Since the barrier plays a crucial role in determining the game
winner ahead of time, several methods have been proposed to
construct it, such as HJI method, geometrical arguments and
numerical approximation [35]–[42].
The main contributions are as follows. First, for the game
of kind [15], an attack subspace (AS) method is proposed to
construct the barrier analytically, and this is the first time in the
existing literature to construct the barrier directly for arbitrarily
high-dimensional space. Moreover, since the constructed bar-
rier is represented in a closed form, the high computational
complexity or inaccuracy arising in other methods introduced
above, are overcome. Thus, this method is applicable for real-
time implementation. Second, the solution to a game of degree
[15] is provided. In view of the guaranteed winning for the
defenders, a practical payoff function is designed, and the
optimal strategy for each player, which essentially is a saddle-
point equilibrium, is elaborated and referred as a command to
an optimal point which is exactly located. The work [17] is
most similar to this work in its approach. However, our current
work not only constructs the barrier analytically for guarding a
subspace of arbitrary dimension, but also presents all optimal
strategies in an analytical form.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we formulate the game, and state our assumptions, notations
and problems. Section III performs efficient simplification.
In Section IV-A, several important concepts and properties
are presented. In Sections IV-B and IV-C, the expressions
of the barrier and winning subspaces are derived. In Section
V, a game of degree is investigated, and the related saddle-
point equilibrium is discussed in detail. Section VI provides a
three-dimensional example to highlight the theoretical devel-
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Fig. 1. Subspace guarding game with two defenders and one attacker in
three-dimensional space (n = 3), where T = {z ∈ R3|z3 = 0},Ωtar =
{z ∈ R3|z3 ≤ 0} and Ωplay = {z ∈ R
3|z3 > 0}.
opments. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A differential game of guarding a subspace in high-
dimensional space is considered. The game is played in Rn
(n ∈ N,n ≥ 2,Rn = Rn×1), in which a hyperplane T splits
the game space Rn into two disjoint subspaces Ωtar and Ωplay,
and their expressions are given as follows:
T = {z ∈ Rn|KTz = b},Ωtar = {z ∈ Rn|KTz ≤ b}
Ωplay = {z ∈ Rn|KTz > b}
(1)
where K ∈ Rn and b ∈ R are the known parameters, and
K is a nonzero vector. Note that T ⊂ Ωtar. Two defenders
PD1 , PD2 and one attacker PA, assumed to be three mass
points in Rn, can move freely with simple motion [15], i.e.,
they are able to change the directions of their motion at each
instant of time. The attacker PA is considered to have been
captured as soon as his Euclidean distance from the closer
defender becomes equal to zero. The attacker, starting from
Ωplay, aims at reaching Ωtar without being captured, while
two defenders, initially distributed in any positions of the game
space, cooperate to guard Ωtar by capturing PA. Thus, these
two subspaces Ωtar and Ωplay shall be called target subspace
and play subspace respectively. We call T as target hyperplane
(TH). If n = 3, the game components are shown in Fig. 1.
The game terminates when the attacker reaches the target
subspace Ωtar before captured, or at least one of two defenders
captures the attacker in Ωplay. If the former happens, the
attacker wins, and if the latter happens, two defenders win.
Define the unit control set U = {u ∈ Rn|‖u‖2 = 1},
where ‖ · ‖2 stands for the Euclidean norm in Rn. Denote
the positions, or called states, of PDi and PA at time t in
R
n by xDi(t) = (xDi,1(t), · · · , xDi,n(t))T and xA(t) =
(xA,1(t), · · · , xA,n(t))T respectively, where T stands for the
transposition. The dynamics of three players for t ≥ 0 have
the form
x˙Di(t) = vDdi(t), xDi(0) = x
0
Di , i = 1, 2
x˙A(t) = vAa(t), xA(0) = x
0
A.
(2)
Here, x0Di = (x
0
Di,1
, · · · , x0Di,n)T is the initial position of
PDi , x
0
A = (x
0
A,1, · · · , x0A,n)T is the initial position of
3PA, and the control inputs at time t for PDi and PA are
their respective instantaneous unit headings di(t) ∈ U and
a(t) ∈ U . The positive parameters vD and vA are the speeds of
PDi and PA respectively. Thus, the whole state space is R
3n.
Unless for clarity, for simplicity, t will be omitted hereinafter.
Note that two defenders are homogeneous, as they have the
same speed vD. Let U2 = U × U denote the joint control set
of two defenders, and since all possible cooperations between
them are considered, the controls d1 and d2 will be selected
simultaneously. Thus, let d = [dT1 ,d
T
2 ]
T ∈ U2 denote the
control of the defense team which can be regarded as a single
player with two inputs.
A. Information Structure, Strategy and Payoffs
We focus on a non-anticipative information structure, as
commonly adopted in the differential game literature (see
for example, [7], [43]). Under this information structure, two
defenders are allowed to make decisions about their current
inputs with all the information of the speeds and current
positions of all players, plus the attacker’s current input. While
the attacker is at a slight disadvantage under this information
structure, at a minimum he has access to sufficient information
to use the speeds and current positions of all players, because
the defenders must declare their strategies before the attacker
chooses a specific input and thus the attacker can determine
the response of the defenders to any input signal. Hence, the
target guarding games or called reach-avoid games formulated
here are an instantiation of the Stackelberg game [4].
Determining which team will win the game gives rise to a
game of kind [15], which provides two outcomes of the game
depending on which team can achieve its objective. In practice,
with the prior game results extracted out from the game of
kind, it is a natural instinct to investigate the optimal strategies
for the players in their winning subspaces by designing some
critical payoff functions.
If the initial state occurs in the part of state space R3n
where two defenders can guarantee their winning, assume that
two defenders want to capture the attacker at a point with
the maximum distance to Ωtar, while the attacker tries to
minimize its final distance to Ωtar although the capture cannot
be avoided. Thus, this payoff function, also called attacker-
target terminal distance, is given as follows:
JT (d,a;x
0
D1,x
0
D2 ,x
0
A) = min
p∈T
‖xA(t1)− p‖2 (3)
where t1 is the time when PA is captured.
If the initial state lies in the part of state space R3n where
the solution of the game of kind indicates that, under optimal
plays, the attacker will reach Ωtar without being captured by
two defenders, the following payoff function is proposed:
Jd(d,a;x
0
D1 ,x
0
D2 ,x
0
A) = min
i=1,2
‖xDi(t2)− xA(t2)‖2 (4)
where t2 is the attacker’s first arrival time into Ωtar. This
payoff function (4), also called defender-attacker terminal
distance or safe distance on arrival, can be interpreted that:
The attacker strives to maximize its distance from the closer
defender when arriving at T , while two defenders seek the
opposite. Moreover, this payoff function also indicates that
the attacker wants to reach T under the safest condition. We
emphasize here that the payoff function (4) is introduced just
for the later proof.
B. Assumptions and Notations
We summarize here the assumptions we shall need through-
out the paper. The first ones are concerned with the initial
configurations of three players.
Assumption 1. ‖x0D1−x0D2‖2 > 0, ‖x0Di−x0A‖2 > l, i = 1, 2.
Assumption 2. KTx0A > b,x
0
Di
∈ Rn, that is, x0A ∈
Ωplay,x
0
Di
∈ Ωplay ∪ Ωtar, i = 1, 2.
The explanations for these two assumptions are as follows.
Assumption 1 states that all players start the game from
different initial positions and PA is not captured by two
defenders initially. Since the point-capture case is considered,
we set l = 0. Note that Assumption 2 confines x0A in Ωplay,
which comes from our game setup.
Define α = vA/vD to be the speed ratio between PA and
PDi . We focus on faster defenders in this paper.
Assumption 3. vD > vA > 0, i.e., 0 < α < 1.
Let ei ∈ Rn denote the vector of its ith element equal to 1
and the others equal to 0, In denote the identity matrix of size
n, and 0m×n denote the m× n zero matrix. For any z ∈ Rn,
denote the remaining part when its ith element is removed
by z−i ∈ Rn−1. For example, x0Di,−n ∈ Rn−1 denotes the
remaining part of x0Di when its n-th element x
0
Di,n
is removed.
For clarity, introduce several critical notations related to the
initial positions of two defenders. Define Aij = x
0
Di,−n
−
x0Dj ,−n, Bij = (x
0
Di,−n
+ x0Dj ,−n)/2, Cij = ‖Aij‖22In−1 −
AijA
T
ij ,mij = x
0
Di,n
− x0Dj ,n, and wij = (‖x0Di‖22 −
‖x0Dj‖22)/2. Thus, it can be seen that Aij ∈ Rn−1, Bij ∈
R
n−1, Cij ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1), mij ∈ R and wij ∈ R. Also note
that Bij = Bji and Cij = Cji.
Define the following two matrixes, which will be used for
characterizing the barrier and winning subspaces
Ξi =
[
−In−1 0(n−1)×1 x
0
Di,−n
01×(n−1) 1/α
2−1 0
(x0Di,−n)
T 0 α2(x0Di,n)
2−‖x0Di‖
2
2
]
Ξij =
[
−ζij,2 0(n−1)×1 −ζij,3
01×(n−1) ζij,1 0
−ζTij,3 0 −ζij,4
] (5)
where the involved parameters are given as follows:
ζij,1 = (1− α2)‖Aij‖22, ζij,2 = Cij − (1 − α2)‖Aij‖22In−1
ζij,3 = (1− α2)Aijwij − α2CijBij
ζij,4 = (1− α2)α2ATij(‖x0Dj‖22x0Di,−n − ‖x0Di‖22x0Dj ,−n)
+ α4BTijCijBij − (1− α2)2w2ij .
(6)
Notice that ζij,1 and ζij,4 are scalar, ζij,2 ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1) and
ζij,3 ∈ Rn−1. Additionally, Ξi and Ξij are two (n+1)×(n+1)
matrixes. It can be verified that Ξij = Ξji.
Let N1,N12 and N2 denote three subspaces of TH T , each
position of which PD1 can reach with less, the same and more
4minimal time with respect to PD2 , respectively. Thus, they can
be mathematically formulated as follows:
N1 = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − x0D1‖2 < ‖z − x0D2‖2,KTz = b}
N12 = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − x0D1‖2 = ‖z − x0D2‖2,KTz = b}
N2 = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − x0D1‖2 > ‖z − x0D2‖2,KTz = b}
(7)
which will play a crucial role in our following analysis.
Next, define two notations associated with the relative initial
position of PA with respect to the defender PDi as follows:
θi =
x0A − α2x0Di
1− α2 , δi =
α‖x0A − x0Di‖2
1− α2 (8)
whose geometric meanings will be stated in Section IV-A.
Note that θi ∈ Rn and δi ∈ R.
Finally, introduce several notations to simplify the expres-
sions of optimal strategies obtained later. Define
R1 = A12A
T
12 +m
2
12In−1, R2 = (θ1,nm12 − w12)A12
−m212θ1,−n, r3 = w212 − 2θ1,nw12m12 +m212(‖θ1‖22 − δ21).
(9)
Notice that R1 ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1), R2 ∈ Rn−1 and r3 ∈ R. The
reasons why (9) is used will be explained in Section V.
C. Problems
For this subspace guarding game in high-dimensional space,
two problems will be addressed.
Problem 1 (Game of kind). Given K, b, and any admissible
initial configuration KTx0A > b and x
0
Di
∈ Rn(i = 1, 2),
which team can guarantee its own winning? Does this game
end up with a successful capture or a successful attack when
both team adopt their optimal strategies?
Problem 2 (Game of degree). If the defense team can guaran-
tee the capture in Ωplay, two defenders or the attacker needs
to find a proper control input based on their or its accessible
information, such that the maximum or minimum of the payoff
function (3) is achieved. In other words, find a saddle-point
equilibrium (d∗,a∗) of the maxmin problem:
V 2T (x
0
D1 ,x
0
D2 ,x
0
A) = max
d∈U2
min
a∈U
JT (d,a;x
0
D1,x
0
D2 ,x
0
A)
(10)
where V 2T is the corresponding value function.
III. EFFICIENT SIMPLIFICATION
In this section, we describe this game in a clearer way. The
TH and two subspaces in (1) can be represented by
T = {z ∈ Rn|zn = 0},Ωtar = {z ∈ Rn|zn ≤ 0}
Ωplay = {z ∈ Rn|zn > 0}.
(11)
Thus, without loss of generality, we focus on (11) hereinafter.
Hence, (11) implies that the three subspaces N1,N12 and
N2 defined in (7) can be rewritten in the new coordinate
system as follows. For N1, since KTz = b⇔ zn = 0, then
‖z − x0D1‖2 < ‖z − x0D2‖2 ⇒ 2(x0D1,−n − x0D2,−n)Tz−n
> ‖x0D1‖22 − ‖x0D2‖22 ⇒ AT12z−n > w12.
Therefore, in the similar way, these three subspaces in the new
coordinate system are given as follows:
N1 = {z ∈ Rn|AT12z−n > w12, zn = 0}
N12 = {z ∈ Rn|AT12z−n = w12, zn = 0}
N2 = {z ∈ Rn|AT21z−n > w21, zn = 0}.
(12)
To simplify the analysis further, Problem 1 can be refor-
mulated: By fixing two defenders’ initial positions, we aim to
find the subspace of Ωplay where if the attacker initially lies,
two defenders can guarantee the capture before the attacker
reaches the TH T , which is the DWS, and find the subspace
of Ωplay allowing for a successful attacking strategy for the
attacker, which is the AWS. The surface that separates these
two subspaces is the barrier. Fixing two defenders’ initial
positions provides a clear illustration of the barrier and thus
two wining subspaces as the functions of these initial positions.
Let B1(x0Di , α),W1D(x0Di , α) and W1A(x0Di , α) denote the
barrier, DWS and AWS determined by PDi respectively,
which implies that these variants only depend on PDi ’s initial
position and the speed ratio as is proved below.
For two defenders PD1 , PD2 and one attacker PA, let
B2(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α),W2D(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) and W2A(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α)
denote the associated barrier, DWS and AWS respectively.
If PDi satisfies x
0
Di
∈ Ωtar, we introduce a virtual defender
P˜Di with initial position x˜
0
Di
such that x˜0Di,m = x
0
Di,m
(m =
1, · · · , n − 1) and x˜0Di,n = −x0Di,n. Thus, it can be easily
observed that the virtual defender and its original defender
are symmetric with respect to the TH T .
Next, a property on the barrier construction is stated.
Lemma 1 (Mirror property). For PDi and j 6= i(i, j ∈ {1, 2}),
if x0Di ∈ Ωtar, B2(x0Di ,x0Dj , α) = B2(x˜0Di ,x0Dj , α) holds.
Proof: We postpone the proof to Appendix.
Remark 1. Note that Lemma 1 shows that the virtual defender
plays the same role with its original defender in barrier con-
struction and thus in determining winning subspaces. Hence,
for clarity, all proofs below involving the barrier construc-
tion will only focus on the discussion under the condition
x0Di ∈ Ωplay ∪ T (i = 1, 2), but these relevant results are
stated and hold under Assumption 2.
IV. BARRIER AND WINNING SUBSPACES
This section focuses on Problem 1, namely, which team will
win the game, which is a game of kind.
A. Preliminaries
We begin our analysis with some preliminary results. Let
the set of points in the game space which PA can reach before
the defender(s), regardless of the defender(s)’ best effort, be
called AS, and the surface which bounds AS is called the
boundary of AS (BAS).
Denote the AS and BAS associated with PDi and PA
by R1A(x0A,x0Di , α) and bas1(x0A,x0Di , α) respectively. Thus,
according to the definitions, the AS and BAS can be given by
R1A(x0A,x0Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − x0A‖2 < α‖z − x0Di‖2}
bas1(x0A,x
0
Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − x0A‖2 = α‖z − x0Di‖2}.
(13)
5Note that
‖z − x0A‖2 < α‖z − x0Di‖2 ⇒
(1 − α2)‖z‖22 − 2(x0A − α2x0Di)Tz < α2‖x0Di‖22 − ‖x0A‖22
⇒
∥∥∥z − x0A − α2x0Di
1− α2
∥∥∥2
2
<
α2‖x0A − x0Di‖22
(1− α2)2
⇒ ‖z − θi‖22 < δ2i
where θi and δi are defined in (8). Thus, R1A(x0A,x0Di , α)
is the interior of a ball of radius δi centered at θi, which
also explains the geometric meanings of δi and θi. Naturally,
bas1(x0A,x
0
Di
, α) is the sphere. Then, the ASR1A(x0A,x0Di , α)
and BAS bas1(x0A,x
0
Di
, α) in (13) can be simplified:
R1A(x0A,x0Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − θi‖2 < δi}
bas1(x0A,x
0
Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − θi‖2 = δi}.
(14)
If n = 2, then bas1(x0A,x
0
Di
, α) is actually the Apollonius
circle [26], and R1A(x0A,x0Di , α) is the interior of this circle.
Let R2A(x0A,x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) and bas2(x0A,x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) de-
note the AS and BAS determined by two defenders PD1 , PD2
and one attacker PA, respectively. Similarly, the AS is the set
of points in Rn that PA can reach before both two defenders,
which is formally stated below:
R2A(x0A,x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) ={z ∈ Rn|‖z − x0A‖2
< α‖z − x0Di‖2, i = 1, 2}.
(15)
Then, (15) can also be equivalently rewritten as
R2A(x0A,x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − θi‖2 < δi, i = 1, 2}.
Hence, R2A(x0A,x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) is the intersection set of two
balls’ interiors R1A(x0A,x0D1 , α) and R1A(x0A,x0D2 , α). Natu-
rally, its boundary is bas2(x0A,x
0
D1
,x0D2 , α).
Unless needed for clarity, to simplify notations, hereinafter,
we drop the initial conditions and speed ratio occurring in the
expressions defined before. It is worth emphasizing that the
geometric meanings of θi, δi,R1A, bas1,R2A and bas2 will be
frequently used. Next, we present two important lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Matrix property). The square matrix Cij is positive
semidefinite, and the three matrixes Aij , Bij and Cij satisfy
CijAij = 0, A
T
ijCij = 0, CijCij = ‖Aij‖22Cij
Cijx
0
Di,−n = Cijx
0
Dj ,−n = CijBij .
(16)
Proof: From Section II-B, it can be easily observed that Cij
is symmetric. Take any x in Rn−1, we have
xTCijx = ‖Aij‖22‖x‖22 − (ATijx)2 ≥ 0.
Thus, Cij is positive semidefinite.
According to the definition, note that
CijAij = (‖Aij‖22In−1 −AijATij)Aij = 0.
Thus, ATijCij = 0 also holds. Furthermore, we have
CijCij = (‖Aij‖22In−1 −AijATij)Cij = ‖Aij‖22Cij .
By considering the definitions of Aij and Bij stated in Section
II-B, it can be obtained that
CijAij = 0⇒ Cijx0Di,−n = Cijx0Dj ,−n = CijBij .
Thus, we finish the proof.
Lemma 3 (Optimal trajectories). Consider the system (2)
satisfying Assumptions 1-3. If two defenders can guarantee
to capture the attacker in Ωplay, namely, x
0
A ∈ W2D, JT in
(3) is adopted by two teams, and if the attacker can assure its
arrival in Ωtar, namely, x
0
A ∈ W2A, Jd in (4) is adopted by
two teams. Then, the optimal headings of PD1 , PD2 and PA
are constant and the optimal trajectories are straight lines.
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that three players
have simple motion and the payoff function JT in (3) or Jd
in (4) is of Meyer type.
B. One Defender Versus One Attacker
We first present the barrier and winning subspaces for the
case with one defender PDi and one attacker PA, which will
provide key insights into the barrier construction for the two-
defender scenario.
Suppose that PA initially lies at a position from which PA
can reach T without being captured, and denote its optimal
target point (OTP) in T by p∗ such that the payoff function
Jd in (4) involving only one defender PDi is maximized.
Note that the non-anticipative information structure implies
that PDi knows PA’s current input. Since PDi aims to mini-
mize Jd in (4), the optimal strategy for PDi is to move towards
the same target point, i.e., p∗, in T as PA does. Hence, by
combining with Lemma 3, in one defender case, the payoff
function Jd involving only one defender PDi , is equivalent to
the following function defined on the TH T :
Fi(p) = ‖p− x0Di‖2 −
‖p− x0A‖2
α
,p ∈ T (17)
representing the distance between PDi and PA exactly when
PA reaches a point p in T , as PDi and PA move towards p
with straight trajectories. If PDi and PA both adopt their op-
timal strategies to minimize and maximize Fi(p) respectively,
then p∗ must be an extreme point of Fi(p), namely,
∂Fi(p
∗)
∂p
−n
= 0⇒ p
∗
−n − x0Di,−n
‖p∗ − x0Di‖2
=
p∗−n − x0A,−n
α‖p∗ − x0A‖2
(18)
by noting that p,p∗ ∈ T implies that pn = p∗n = 0. We can
conclude that if p∗ is an OTP in T , it must satisfy (18). Due to
its highly frequent use, (18) is called the first-order necessary
condition for an OTP, and for short, it is also called FNC.
Lemma 4 (Barrier and winning subspaces for one defender).
Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. If the system (2) has
only one defender PDi , then the barrier B1 and two winning
subspaces W1D and W1A are respectively given by
B1(x0Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|Z = [zT, 1]T,
ZTΞiZ = 0, zn > 0}
W1D(x0Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|Z = [zT, 1]T,
ZTΞiZ > 0, zn > 0}
W1A(x0Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|Z = [zT, 1]T,
ZTΞiZ < 0, zn > 0}
(19)
6and when x0A ∈ B1, the OTP p∗ in T for PDi and PA is
uniquely given by
p∗−n = θi,−n, p
∗
n = 0. (20)
Proof: Consider x0A ∈ B1 and assume that p∗ is its OTP
in T such that Jd in (4) is maximized, then FNC (18) holds
when PDi strives to minimize Jd. Furthermore, according to
Lemma 3, x0A ∈ B1 implies that
‖p∗ − x0A‖2 = α‖p∗ − x0Di‖2 (21)
which reflects the fact that when PA initially lies at the barrier
B1, PDi and PA will reach the OTP p∗ at the same time if
their respective optimal strategies are adopted. In other words,
if PA initially lies at the barrier B1, no player can win the
game, that is, the capture and arrival occur at the same time.
Thus, it follows from the FNC (18) and (21) that
(1− α2)p∗−n = x0A,−n − α2x0Di,−n. (22)
Also notice that p∗ ∈ T implies that p∗n = 0. Hence, when
x0A ∈ B1, the OTP p∗ for PDi and PA is uniquely given by
(20), where θi is defined in (8).
Since p∗n = 0, (21) can be simplified as
‖p∗−n − x0A,−n‖22 + (x0A,n)2
= α2‖p∗−n − x0Di,−n‖22 + α2(x0Di,n)2.
(23)
Then, substituting p∗−n given by (22) into (23) leads to
‖x
0
A,−n − α2x0Di,−n
1− α2 − x
0
A,−n‖22 + (x0A,n)2
= α2‖x
0
A,−n − α2x0Di,−n
1− α2 − x
0
Di,−n‖22 + α2(x0Di,n)2
⇒ (x0A,n)2 −
α2‖x0A,−n − x0Di,−n‖22
1− α2 − α
2(x0Di,n)
2 = 0
⇒ (1/α2 − 1)(x0A,n)2 − ‖x0A,−n‖22 + 2(x0Di,−n)Tx0A,−n
+ α2(x0Di,n)
2 − ‖x0Di‖22 = 0
(24)
which characterizes the relationship between initial positions
of PDi and PA when x
0
A ∈ B1. Thus, given x0Di , by taking all
positions of x0A,−n in R
n−1, x0A,n can be explicitly computed
from (24), and thus all positions of PA lying at B1 are found.
Equivalently, these initial positions of PA form the barrier B1.
Define Z = [(x0A)
T, 1]T. By matrix multiplication, a com-
pact formulation for the last equation in (24) can be achieved:
ZTΞiZ = 0
where the matrix Ξi is defined in (5). Note that Assumption 2
and (11) imply that x0A,n > 0 holds. Thus, the barrier B1 is
given by (19).
Notice that 1/α2 − 1 > 0 for the last equation in (24).
Since W1D and W1A are two subspaces of Ωplay and separated
by B1, and W1A is closer to T than W1D, it follows from the
last equation in (24) that these two winning subspaces satisfy
the constraint stated in (19).
C. Two Defenders Versus One Attacker
As will be shown below, B2 has two types. The first one
is only dependent on one of two defenders, and the second
one is associated with both two defenders. The conditions to
distinguish them are as follows. For clarity, the defender which
contributes to the barrier, is called active defender.
Lemma 5 (Classification conditions). Suppose that Assump-
tions 1-3 hold.
a (Two active defenders). The barrier B2 is associated with
both two defenders, if and only if
x0D1,−n 6= x0D2,−n, or
x0D1,−n = x
0
D2,−n, x
0
D1,n = −x0D2,n.
(25)
b (One active defender). Otherwise, for x0D1,−n = x
0
D2,−n
,
if |x0D1,n| < |x0D2,n|, the barrier B2 only depends on PD1 ,
i.e., B2 = B1(x0D1 , α), and if |x0D1,n| > |x0D2,n|, the
barrier B2 only depends on PD2 , i.e., B2 = B1(x0D2 , α).
Proof: Consider case (a) first. Assume that (25) holds. If
x0D1,−n 6= x0D2,−n, namely, A12 is a nonzero vector, it can be
seen that T ’s three subspaces N1,N12 and N2 in (12) are all
nonempty. Thus, there must exist points in T for each defender
that it can reach before the other defender.
Let p be a point in T that PD1 can reach before PD2 , i.e.,
p ∈ N1. Thus, the attacker whose initial position lies at B2
with p as its OTP, could be captured assuringly only by PD1
while beyond the capability of PD2 . Therefore, B2 depends
on PD1 . In the similar way, it can be obtained that B2 also
depends on PD2 . Thus, B2 depends on both two defenders.
If x0D1,−n = x
0
D2,−n
and x0D1,n = −x0D2,n, it can be seen
that two defenders are symmetric with respect to T , implying
that for any point p in T , two defenders can reach with the
same time. Thus, B2 depends on both two defenders. Actually,
the mirror property stated in Lemma 1 also reveals that two
defenders symmetric with respect to T play the same role in
barrier construction, as Remark 1 illustrates.
Conversely, assume that x0D1,−n = x
0
D2,−n
and x0D1,n 6=−x0D2,n. If |x0D1,n| < |x0D2,n|, for any point p in T , we have
‖x0D1 − p‖2 < ‖x0D2 − p‖2
meaning that PD1 can reach any position in T before PD2 ,
and this feature guarantees that the barrier B2 is determined
by PD1 alone, that is, B2 = B1(x0D1 , α). If |x0D1,n| > |x0D2,n|,
analogously, it can be concluded that the barrier B2 is deter-
mined by PD2 alone, that is, B2 = B1(x0D2 , α). Thus, the case
(a) is proved.
According to the argument for case (a), the conclusion in
case (b) is straightforward.
Next, we construct the barrier and winning subspaces. As
Lemma 5 states, the ones for one active defender case can
be obtained directly from Section IV-B. Thus, our attention
will be paid to the two active defender case where both two
defenders make contributions to the construction of the barrier.
Theorem 1 (Barrier and winning subspaces for two active
defenders). Consider the system (2) satisfying Assumptions 1-
73. Suppose that (25) is true. If x0D1,−n 6= x0D2,−n, the barrier
B2 is given by ⋃3i=1 B2i , which consists of three parts:
B2i (x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) = {z ∈ Rn|Z = [zT, 1]T,
ZTΞiZ = 0, zn > 0, z ∈ Ai}(i = 1, 2)
B23(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) = {z ∈ Rn|Z = [zT, 1]T,
ZTΞ12Z = 0, zn > 0, z ∈ A12}
(26)
where the constraints for the first n− 1 dimensions of z are
Ai = {z ∈ Rn|ATijz−n − α2ATijx0Di,−n
> (1 − α2)wij}(i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j)
A12 = {z ∈ Rn|z ∈ Rn \ (A1 ∪ A2)}.
(27)
The winning subspaceW2D is the subspace given by (26) with
the expression = 0 replaced by > 0, and W2A corresponds to
the case by replacing = 0 in (26) with < 0. If x0D1,−n =
x0D2,−n and x
0
D1,n
= −x0D2,n, the barrier B2, two winning
subspaces W2D and W2A are given by
B2(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) = B1(x0D1 , α) = B1(x0D2 , α)
W2D(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) =W1D(x0D1 , α) =W1D(x0D2 , α)
W2A(x0D1 ,x0D2 , α) =W1A(x0D1 , α) =W1A(x0D2 , α).
(28)
Proof: Since (25) holds, it follows from Lemma 5 that B2
depends on both two defenders. We first consider the case
x0D1,−n 6= x0D2,−n.
Then, as the proof of Lemma 5 shows, there exist points in
T for each defender that it can reach before the other defender.
Hence, three associated subspaces N1,N12 and N2 in (12) are
all nonempty. Assume x0A ∈ B2 and denote its OTP in T by
p∗ such that the payoff function Jd in (4) is maxmized. Define
Z = [(x0A)
T, 1]T.
If p∗ lies in the subspace N1, then PD1 can reach p∗ before
PD2 . Thus, in this case, the barrier only depends on PD1 , and
according to Lemma 4, the barrier can be constructed by (19)
with i = 1 as follows:
ZTΞ1Z = 0, x
0
A,n > 0
and by (20), the OTP p∗ for PD1 and PA is given by
p∗−n = θ1,−n, p
∗
n = 0. (29)
Since p∗ ∈ N1, (12) and (29) lead to
AT12θ1,−n > w12 ⇒ AT12(x0A,−n − α2x0D1,−n) > (1− α2)w12
representing the constraint that x0A,−n satisfies. This constraint
can be equivalently reformulated as x0A ∈ A1, where A1 is
defined in (27). Therefore, the part of B2 which only depends
on PD1 , denoted by B21, is obtained as (26) shows.
Analogously, if p∗ lies in the subspace N2, we can obtain
that the part of B2 which only depends on PD2 , denoted by
B22, is also as (26) describes.
Now, turn to the remaining part B23 of B2 when p∗ lies in
the subspace N12, namely, two defenders capture PA at the
same time and thus limit the OTP p∗ in N12. Therefore, the
OTP p∗ for three players is an extreme point of the function
F1(p) in (17) with the constraint p ∈ N12.
Note that N12 is given by (12), and thus define the associ-
ated Hamiltonian function
H1(p, λ) = F1(p) + λ(A
T
12p−n − w12), pn = 0
where λ ∈ R is the Lagrangian multiplier. Therefore, the OTP
p∗ meets the optimality conditions of H1 as follows:
∂H1
∂p−n
=
p∗−n − x0D1,−n
‖p∗ − x0D1‖2
− p
∗
−n − x0A,−n
α‖p∗ − x0A‖2
+A12λ = 0
(30a)
∂H1
∂λ
= AT12p
∗
−n − w12 = 0. (30b)
Since p∗n = 0, in what follows, we focus on p
∗
−n. Note that
x0A ∈ B2 implies that PA reaches the OTP p∗ exactly when
captured, so we have (21) with i = 1, and substituting it into
(30a) yields
x0A,−n − α2x0D1,−n − (1 − α2)p∗−n
α2‖p∗ − x0D1‖2
+A12λ = 0
⇒ (1− α
2)(θ1,−n − p∗−n)
α2‖p∗ − x0D1‖2
+A12λ = 0.
(31)
Since x0D1,−n 6= x0D2,−n, then ‖A12‖22 is positive. For (31),
by multiplying AT12 from the left, we can obtain
λ = − (1− α
2)AT12(θ1,−n − p∗−n)
α2‖A12‖22‖p∗ − x0D1‖2
(32)
and then substituting (32) into (31) and combining (30b) lead
to p∗−n explicitly given by
p∗−n = θ1,−n −
A12A
T
12(θ1,−n − p∗−n)
‖A12‖22
= θ1,−n − A12A
T
12θ1,−n −A12w12
‖A12‖22
=
C12θ1,−n +A12w12
‖A12‖22
.
(33)
Thus, we obtain the OTP p∗ for three players when x0A ∈ B23.
Next, the analytical description of B23 will be investigated.
According to the property of simultaneous arriving (21) for
i = 1 and p∗n = 0, we have
‖p∗ − x0A‖22 = α2‖p∗ − x0D1‖22 ⇒ ‖p∗−n‖22
− 2θT1,−np∗−n + (‖x0A‖22 − α2‖x0D1‖22)/(1− α2) = 0.
(34)
By (33) and (16), the two terms ‖p∗−n‖22 and θT1,−np∗−n in (34)
can be computed as follows:
‖p∗−n‖22 =
θT1,−nC12θ1,−n + w
2
12
‖A12‖22
θT1,−np
∗
−n =
θT1,−nC12θ1,−n + θ
T
1,−nA12w12
‖A12‖22
.
(35)
Therefore, by (35), (34) can be simplified to
−θT1,−nC12θ1,−n + w212 − 2θT1,−nA12w12
‖A12‖22
+
‖x0A‖22 − α2‖x0D1‖22
1− α2 = 0.
(36)
8Furthermore, considering the expression of θ1,−n in (8) and
employing the property (16), we can obtain two equalities
θT1,−nC12θ1,−n =
(x0A,−n)
TC12x
0
A,−n
(1− α2)2
+
−2α2(x0A,−n)TC12x0D1,−n + α4(x0D1,−n)TC12x0D1,−n
(1− α2)2
=
(x0A,−n)
TC12x
0
A,−n
(1 − α2)2
+
−2α2(x0A,−n)TC12B12 + α4BT12C12B12
(1− α2)2
(37)
and
θT1,−nA12 =
(x0A,−n)
TA12 − α2(x0D1,−n)TA12
1− α2 .
(38)
Therefore, by substituting these two equalities (37) and (38),
the equation (36) can be equivalently rewritten as
ζ12,1(x
0
A,n)
2 = (x0A,−n)
Tζ12,2x
0
A,−n + 2ζ
T
12,3x
0
A,−n + ζ12,4
(39)
where ζ12,i(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is defined in (6) which only depends
on two defenders’ initial positions and the speed ratio. It is
worth noting that in computing the term ζ12,4 for (39), the
following equality is used:
A12‖x0D1‖22 − 2x0D1,−nw12
= (x0D1,−n − x0D2,−n)‖x0D1‖22 − x0D1,−n(‖x0D1‖22 − ‖x0D2‖22)
= ‖x0D2‖22x0D1,−n − ‖x0D1‖22x0D2,−n.
In a compact form, (39) can also be rewritten as
ZTΞ12Z = 0 (40)
where the matrix Ξ12 is defined in (5). Therefore, (40) is the
condition that x0A should satisfy when PA lies at B23.
Denote by A12 the constraint for x0A,−n when p∗ ∈ N12.
As (7) and (12) shows, N12 is the complementary of the union
space of N1 and N2 in T , and thus so is A12 with respect to
A1 and A2 in Rn. Hence, B23 is obtained analytically as (26)
and (27) show. The construction of the barrier B2 is finished.
As (24) and (39) show, it can be noted that (1/α2− 1) > 0
in (24) and ζ12,1 > 0 in (39), and actually B2 is constructed by
taking all positions in the first n−1 dimensional subspace and
then computing their values in the n-th dimensional subspace
based on (24) or (39) classified by (27). Thus, for two winning
subspaces W2D and W2A, since W2D is farther from T than
W2A and they both belong to the subspace Ωplay, the analytical
descriptions of them are straightforward as this theorem states.
Now, we consider the case x0D1,−n = x
0
D2,−n
and x0D1,n =−x0D2,n. It can be verified that A12 is a zero vector and
w12 = 0. Then, (12) shows that N1 = N2 = ∅ and N12 = T ,
implying that for any point in T , two defenders can reach
with the same time. Hence, B2 = B1(x0D1 , α) = B1(x0D2 , α),
as (28) shows. The winning subspaces W2D and W2A are
straightforward. Thus, we finish the proof.
Remark 2. As the proof of Theorem 1 indicates, if x0A ∈
B2i (i = 1, 2), the OTP for PDi and PA is unique and given by
(20), and PDj (j 6= i) can adopt any strategy in U . If x0A ∈ B23,
the OTP p∗ = [p∗T−n, 0]
T for three players is uniquely given
by (33) which can be also rewritten as follows:
p∗−n =
C12θ1,−n +A12w12
‖A12‖22
=
C12x
0
A,−n − α2C12x0D1,−n + (1− α2)A12w12
(1− α2)‖A12‖22
=
C12x
0
A,−n − α2C12B12 + (1− α2)A12w12
(1− α2)‖A12‖22
which reflects the fact that two defenders play the equal role in
capturing PA (i.e., determining the OTP p
∗) in this condition.
V. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN THE DWS
In this section, Problem 2 will be investigated to provide
optimal strategies for three players when their initial positions
lie in the DWS.
Since two defenders can guarantee to capture PA in Ωplay
when the latter lies in the DWS W2D, JT in (3) is considered
by two teams. Denote the capture point by p∗ ∈ Rn, which
is also the OTP for PA such that JT is minimized. Thus, JT
can be rewritten as the distance between p∗ and T , namely
JT (d,a;x
0
D1 ,x
0
D2 ,x
0
A) = min
p∈T
‖p− p∗‖2.
For convenience, define one map φ : Rn × Rn → Rn
satisfying φ(x,y) = x−y‖x−y‖2 with x 6= y. According to the
definition and geometric meaning of the BAS bas2 described
in Section IV-A, the OTP for PA lies on bas
2, i.e., p∗ ∈ bas2.
Then, it follows from Lemma 3 that the optimal strategy for
PA is to travel towards p
∗ directly. Since PA aims to minimize
JT , the following lemma can be obtained directly.
Lemma 6. Consider the system (2) satisfying Assumptions
1-3. If x0A ∈ W2D and the payoff function JT in (3) is
considered, then the capture point p∗ is the closest point to T
on bas2, and the optimal strategy for PA is a
∗ = φ(p∗,x0A).
Next, how to locate the capture point p∗, namely, the OTP,
is discussed. We call the defender which captures the attacker
under all players’ optimal plays, as effective defender.
Theorem 2 (Optimal strategies for DWS). Consider the
system (2) satisfying Assumptions 1-3. If x0A ∈ W2D and the
payoff function JT in (3) is considered, then the saddle-point
equilibrium (d∗,a∗) of (10) is as follows:
a (One effective defender). If there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} such
that θi − δien ∈ R1A(x0A,x0Dj , α) holds for j 6= i, then
d∗j can take any strategy in U , and (d∗i ,a∗) is uniquely
given by
d∗i = φ(p
∗,x0Di),a
∗ = φ(p∗,x0A)
where p∗ is the OTP and given by θi − δien.
b (Two effective defenders). Otherwise, both two defenders
make contributions to (10), and (d∗,a∗) is given by
d∗i = φ(p
∗,x0Di),a
∗ = φ(p∗,x0A), i = 1, 2
9where the OTP p∗ has two cases: If m12 = x
0
D1,n
−
x0D2,n 6= 0, without loss of generality, assume m12 > 0,
and then
p∗−n =
√
RT2R
−1
1 R2 − r3
AT12R
−1
1 A12
R−11 A12 −R−11 R2
p∗n =
w12 −AT12p∗−n
m12
and if m12 = 0, then
p∗−n =
A12w12 + C12θ1,−n
‖A12‖22
p∗n = θ1,n −
√
δ21 − ‖p∗−n − θ1,−n‖22.
(41)
Proof: Part a: As (14) shows, the BAS bas1 determined by
PDi and PA is a sphere of radius δi centered at θi:
bas1(x0A,x
0
Di , α) = {z ∈ Rn|‖z − θi‖2 = δi} (42)
showing that the unique closest point to T on bas1, is θi −
δien, where en ∈ Rn is the vector of its n-th element equal
to 1 and the other elements equal to 0.
Assume that there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} such that θi−δien ∈
R1A(x0A,x0Dj , α)(j 6= i) holds. As stated in Section IV-A, R2A
is the intersection set of two balls’ interiors R1A(x0A,x0D1 , α)
and R1A(x0A,x0D2 , α), and bas2 is the boundary of R2A. Thus,
it can be claimed that θi − δien is the unique closest point to
T on bas2. It follows from Lemma 6 that the capture point
p∗, i.e., the OTP, for PA is
p∗ = θi − δien.
Since θi−δien ∈ R1A(x0A,x0Dj , α), PA can reach θi−δien
before PDj . Thus, PDj has no contribution to the capture of
PA, implying that any strategy in U can be chosen for PDj .
It can be seen that PDi is the unique effective defender, and
its unique OTP such that JT is maximized, is also θi − δien.
Part b: If θ1 − δ1en /∈ R1A(x0A,x0D2 , α) and θ2 − δ2en /∈R1A(x0A,x0D1 , α) both hold, we can state that both two defend-
ers have effect on (10) and the OTP p∗ must belong to the
intersection space of bas1(x0A,x
0
D1
, α) and bas1(x0A,x
0
D2
, α).
Since the goal of PA is to minimize its final distance to T ,
it can be concluded that the OTP p∗ is the solution of the
minimization problem
min
z∈Rn
zn, s.t. ‖z − θ1‖2 = δ1, ‖z − θ2‖2 = δ2. (43)
First, we prove that A12 is a nonzero vector in this case.
If A12 is a zero vector, i.e., x
0
D1,−n
= x0D2,−n, (8) implies
that θ1,−n = θ2,−n. Thus, the vector θ1 − θ2 is perpendicular
to T . Note that θ1 and θ2 are the centers of two spheres
bas1(x0A,x
0
D1
, α) and bas1(x0A,x
0
D2
, α) given by (14) . Thus,
θ1−δ1en ∈ R1A(x0A,x0D2 , α) or θ2−δ2en ∈ R1A(x0A,x0D1 , α)
holds. Even if θ1 − δ1en = θ2 − δ2en, it can be taken as the
limiting case of Part a. Thus, A12 is a nonzero vector.
Next, we transform the problem (43) into a minimization
problem with only one equality constraint. First, by (13) and
(42), the two constraints in (43) can also be rewritten as
‖z − x0A‖2 = α‖z − x0D1‖2, ‖z − x0A‖2 = α‖z − x0D2‖2
(44)
and thus the difference for (44) yields
‖z − x0D1‖2 = ‖z − x0D2‖2
⇒ 2(x0D1 − x0D2)Tz + ‖x0D2‖22 − ‖x0D1‖22 = 0
⇒ m12zn +AT12z−n − w12 = 0
(45)
where m12 = x
0
D1,n
−x0D2,n is defined in Section II-B. There
are two cases depending on whether m12 = 0 holds.
Case 1: If m12 6= 0, (45) can be rewritten as follows:
zn =
w12 −AT12z−n
m12
(46)
and then for the BAS (42) with i = 1, we have
(zn − θ1,n)2 + ‖z−n − θ1,−n‖22 = δ21
⇒
(w12 −AT12z−n
m12
− θ1,n
)2
+ ‖z−n − θ1,−n‖22 = δ21
⇒ zT−nR1z−n + 2RT2z−n + r3 = 0
(47)
where R1, R2 and r3 depend on two defenders’ initial posi-
tions and the speed ratio, and they are stated in (9).
By (9), for any nonzero vector x ∈ Rn−1, we have
xTR1x = (x
TA12)
2 +m212‖x‖22 > 0.
Therefore, R1 is positive definite, implying that there exists a
nonsingular matrix L ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1) such that R1 = LLT.
Define z˜−n = L
Tz−n, and thus z−n = L
−Tz˜−n. Hence, it
follows from (47) that z˜−n satisfies the constraint
z˜T−nL
−1R1L
−Tz˜−n + 2R
T
2L
−Tz˜−n + r3 = 0
⇒ ‖z˜−n‖22 + 2RT2L−Tz˜−n + r3 = 0
⇒ ‖z˜−n + L−1R2‖22 = RT2R−11 R2 − r3.
(48)
Note that RT2R
−1
1 R2−r3 > 0 must hold, as (48) comes from
the BAS (42) with i = 1. Thus, according to (46) and (48), the
optimization problem (43) can be equivalently reformulated as
the following problem which has only one equality constraint
min
z˜−n∈Rn−1
w12 −AT12L−Tz˜−n
m12
s.t. ‖z˜−n + L−1R2‖22 = RT2R−11 R2 − r3.
(49)
Moreover, according to the transformation z−n = L
−Tz˜−n
and (46), if p˜∗−n is the solution of the problem (49), then the
OTP p∗ which is the solution of (43), is given by
p∗−n = L
−Tp˜∗−n, p
∗
n =
w12 −AT12p∗−n
m12
. (50)
Next, we focus on the solution of the problem (49). The
associated Hamiltonian function is
H2(z˜−n,λ) =
w12 −AT12L−Tz˜−n
m12
+ λ(‖z˜−n + L−1R2‖22 −RT2R−11 R2 + r3)
where λ ∈ R is the Lagrangian multiplier. Thus, p˜∗−n satisfies
the following optimality conditions
∂H2
∂z˜−n
= −L
−1A12
m12
+ 2(p˜∗−n + L
−1R2)λ = 0 (51a)
∂H2
∂λ
= ‖p˜∗−n + L−1R2‖22 −RT2R−11 R2 + r3 = 0. (51b)
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Then, multiplying (51a) by (p˜∗−n+L
−1R2)
T from the left and
employing the equality (51b), we can obtain
λ =
(p˜∗−n + L
−1R2)
TL−1A12
2m12(RT2R
−1
1 R2 − r3)
. (52)
Note that m12 and λ are both scalar, and L
−1A12 is not a
zero vector in this case. Thus it follows from (51a) that
L−1A12||(p˜∗−n+L−1R2)⇒ p˜∗−n+L−1R2 = kL−1A12 (53)
holds for a constant k ∈ R.
Substituting (52) into (51a) and combining (53) yield
(k2‖L−1A12‖22 −RT2R−11 R2 + r3)L−1A12 = 0 (54)
and since L−1A12 is a nonzero vector, (54) leads to
k =
√
RT2R
−1
1 R2 − r3
‖L−1A12‖22
=
√
RT2R
−1
1 R2 − r3
AT12R
−1
1 A12
. (55)
Thus, according to (50), (53) and (55), it can be verified that
the OTP p∗ is given by
p∗−n =
√
RT2R
−1
1 R2 − r3
AT12R
−1
1 A12
R−11 A12 −R−11 R2
p∗n =
w12 −AT12p∗−n
m12
.
(56)
Since m12 > 0 and R
−1
1 is positive definite, the reason why
the sign of k in (55) is positive, can be obtained by noting that
p∗n in (56) should take the minimal value.
Case 2: Next, we consider the case m12 = 0. Then, the
equality (45), which is the difference between two constraints
in (43) (equivalent to (44)), becomes
AT12z−n − w12 = 0.
Thus, two constraints for the problem (43) can be replaced by
‖z − θ1‖2 = δ1, AT12z−n − w12 = 0. (57)
The first constraint in (57) can also be rewritten as
(zn − θ1,n)2 = δ21 − ‖z−n − θ1,−n‖22. (58)
Notice that the goal of the problem (43) is to seek the
minimum of zn. Thus, it follows from (57) and (58) that the
OTP p∗ for the problem (43) satisfies
p∗n = θ1,n −
√
δ21 − ‖p∗−n − θ1,−n‖22 (59)
and p∗−n is the solution of the maximization problem
max
z−n∈Rn−1
δ21−‖z−n−θ1,−n‖22, s.t. AT12z−n−w12 = 0. (60)
The Hamiltonian function for the problem (60) is
H3(z−n, λ) = δ
2
1 − ‖z−n − θ1,−n‖22 + λ(AT12z−n − w12)
and p∗−n satisfies the related optimality conditions as follows:
∂H3
∂z−n
= −2(p∗−n − θ1,−n) +A12λ = 0 (61a)
∂H3
∂λ
= AT12p
∗
−n − w12 = 0. (61b)
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Fig. 2. Barrier and winning subspaces for two defenders and one attacker with
α = 0.5 in three-dimensional space (n = 3). The barrier B2 consists of three
parts B21 ,B
2
2 and B
2
3 , where B
2
i
(i = 1, 2) is the part only related to PDi , and
B23 is determined by both two defenders. The barrier B
2 divides Ωplay into
two subspaces: defender winning subspace (DWS) W2
D
and attacker winning
subspace (AWS) W2
A
. If PA lies in W
2
D
, two defenders can capture PA in
Ωplay, and if PA lies in W
2
A
, he can reach Ωtar without being captured,
regardless of two defenders’ strategies. If PA lies at B
2, under the optimal
plays of all players, PA will be captured exactly when reaching T .
Then, multiplying (61a) by AT12 from the left and employing
the equality (61b), we can obtain
λ =
2AT12(p
∗
−n − θ1,−n)
‖A12‖22
=
2(w12 −AT12θ1,−n)
‖A12‖22
. (62)
Substituting (62) into (61a) yields
p∗−n = θ1,−n +
A12(w12 −AT12θ1,−n)
‖A12‖22
=
A12w12 + C12θ1,−n
‖A12‖22
.
(63)
Thus, according to (59) and (63), the OTP p∗ is obtained as
(41) shows. Therefore, we finish the proof.
VI. THREE-DIMENSIONAL ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
For a better illustration of the above achievements, a sub-
space (half-space) guarding game in three-dimensional space
is presented in this section, as Fig. 1 shows.
Take n = 3, and the TH, target subspace and play subspace
are given by T = {z ∈ R3|z3 = 0},Ωtar = {z ∈ R3|z3 ≤ 0}
and Ωplay = {z ∈ R3|z3 > 0} respectively, as Fig. 2 shows.
The initial positions of two defenders (blue circles) are x0D1 =
(−1.5, 0,−1)T and x0D2 = (1.5, 0, 1.5)T. Thus, PD1 ’s virtual
defender P˜D1 (red circle), symmetric with PD1 about the TH
T , satisfies x˜0D1 = (−1.5, 0, 1)T. Take α = 0.5.
A. Barrier and winning subspaces
This part focuses on the qualitative result, namely, which
team can guarantee to win the game.
It follows from the classification conditions (Lemma 5) that
two defenders are both active defenders, implying that two
defenders both contribute to the barrier B2.
According to Theorem 1, we can directly obtain that the
barrier B2 consists of three parts: B21 = {z ∈ R3|z3 =√
z21/3 + z
2
2/3 + z1 + 1, z1 < −7/32},B22 = {z ∈ R3|z3 =√
z21/3 + z
2
2/3− z1 + 21/16, z1 > 17/32} and B23 = {z ∈
11
R
3|z3 =
√−z21 + z22/3 + 5z1/12 + 719/768,−7/32 ≤ z1 ≤
17/32}, as Fig. 2 shows. Visually, in Ωplay, the subspace above
B2 is the DWS W2D , and below B2 is the AWS W2A.
Thus, if x0A ∈ W2D, two defenders can guarantee to capture
PA in Ωplay. If x
0
A ∈ W2A, PA can reach Ωtar without being
captured, irrespective of two defenders’ strategies. If x0A ∈ B2,
under three players’ optimal plays, PA will be captured exactly
when reaching T , that is, no player wins the game.
B. Optimal strategies
This part considers the scenario of two teams trying to play
the game with the best performance. Specifically, if x0A ∈ W2D,
JT in (3) is considerd.
See Theorem 2. Take x0A = (0, 0, 2)
T and thus as Fig.
2 shows, x0A ∈ W2D . It can be verified that θ2 − δ2e3 =
(−1/2, 0, (13− 2√10)/6) ∈ R1A(x0A,x0D1 , 0.5). Hence, only
PD2 is an effective defender. The optimal strategies for PD2
and PA are given by d
∗
2 = φ(p
∗,x0D2) and a
∗ = φ(p∗,x0A)
respectively, where the OTP p∗ is given by (−1/2, 0, (13 −
2
√
10)/6)T, while PD1 can take any strategy in U . Thus,
although PD1 and PD2 both work in the barrier construction,
only PD2 is effective and contributes to the capture of PA.
VII. CONCLUSION
The differential game where two defenders guard a subspace
from one attacker has been solved in analytical form, including
the barrier construction and optimal strategy investigation.
The barrier for one defender and two defender cases were
both constructed, as it was demonstrated that under certain
initial configurations, the barrier depends on only one of two
defenders. Thus, the conditions about initial configurations to
determine whether the barrier depends on both two defenders
or only one of them, were given. The optimal strategies
for three players in the DWS have also been investigated.
If the attacker initially lies in the DWS, the capture can
be guaranteed, and the optimal strategy for each player is
equivalent to finding the capture point which was given
explicitly. This subspace guarding game and its analysis lay
the cornerstone for future and more challenging reach-avoid
games with multiple defenders and attackers. There are few
reach-avoid differential games whose state space dimension is
more than nine, which have been solved in closed form.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove W2A(x0Di ,x0Dj , α) = W2A(x˜0Di ,x0Dj , α), which
suffices to prove this lemma by noting that the barrier B2 is
the separating surface between W2D and W2A.
Suppose z ∈ W2A(x0Di ,x0Dj , α), and then there must exist
a point p in T such that ‖z − p‖2 < α‖x0Dk − p‖2 holds for
k = i, j. Note that ‖x˜0Di − p‖2 = ‖x0Di − p‖2. Thus, it can
be obtained that ‖z − p‖2 < α‖x˜0Di − p‖2.
From the above, we conclude that z ∈ W2A(x˜0Di ,x0Dj , α),
implying that W2A(x0Di ,x0Dj , α) ⊂ W2A(x˜0Di ,x0Dj , α). On the
other side, suppose z ∈ W2A(x˜0Di ,x0Dj , α) and in the similar
way, W2A(x˜0Di ,x0Dj , α) ⊂ W2A(x0Di ,x0Dj , α) can be derived.
Thus, we finish the proof.
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